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ROBERT PLEHN*

Securitization of Third World Debt
Since 1982, the economy has been confronted with the threat that numerous developing nations, especially those in Latin America, will be
unable to repay the enormous debts they owe to both private and public
international creditors. The so-called "debt crisis" has been the focus of
much attention on the parts of public officials, scholars and business
people in both debtor and creditor nations as all have attempted to formulate various solutions to the problem. With the total debt burden of
the three nations with the largest external debt obligations (Brazil, Mexico
and Argentina, respectively) estimated to be approximately 275 billion
dollars as of 1987,1 clearly the debt crisis is deserving of such attention.
In 1984, one study estimated that a default by Latin American debtor
nations alone would cause a loss of world Gross National Product (GNP)
by 1.2 percent annually over two years and a loss of up to 6 percent of
GNP in the defaulting nations. 2 Due to the extent of the problem one
solution will not provide an answer. Rather, numerous strategies, involving sacrifices on the part of all parties involved, will have to be utilized
if the debt crisis is to be resolved in an orderly manner which will have
a minimal negative effect on the world economy and the economies of
the debtor nations.
Among the proposed strategies, securitization of developing nation
(LDC) debt has received much attention as a possible mechanism through
which LDC debtors may be able to satisfy a large portion of their obligations in a manner acceptable to both debtors and creditors. This article
will focus on the feasibility and usefulness of the various attempts, by
both the private and public sector, to securitize LDC debt. Specifically,

*Attorney at Law, Sidley and Austin, New York, New York.
1. Riding, Deepening Gloom OverLatin Debt, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1987, at D8, col. 5.
2. F.

BERGSTEN,

W.

CLINE &

J.

WILLIAMSON,

BANK

LENDING

TO DEVELOPING

TRIES: THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES 16-17 (1985) (citing WHARTON
CASTING ASSOCIATES, WHAT IF LATIN AMERICA DEFAULTS? (1984)).

ECONOMETRIC

COUN-

FORE-

162

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

the 1988 Morgan Guaranty proposal to securitize a portion of Mexican
debt with U.S. Treasury notes, and the various proposed, though not yet
implemented, "junk bond" schemes will be analyzed and compared in
order to assess what type of securitization plan is most likely to succeed
in contributing to the resolution of the world debt crisis. It should be
noted that the details and analysis of the junk bond schemes will be
somewhat less in depth and more 3conjectural due to the secrecy that
surround the details of these plans.
I. What Is Securitization of LDC Debt and How Would It Work?
Basically, any securitization of LDC debt attempts to repackage the
debts so that it can be turned into a negotiable instrument (e.g., a bond),
which at the option of the creditor banks may be sold on secondary
markets to private investors. Unlike debt-equity swaps, which currently
make up the majority of the secondary market for LDC debt, 4 the debt
would not be exchanged for equity investments in the debtor nation.
Rather, the debt would be swapped at a discount for a negotiable instrument that would be more attractive to both creditor banks and third party
investors than the LDC loans that currently exist. Thus, securitization
simply involves a debt for debt swap; but, the swap takes into account
the loss in value of the old debt. The key issues involved in all securitization plans revolve around the allocation of costs and benefits of the
transactions in a manner that is acceptable to both debtors and creditors,
and that at the same time creates an instrument attractive to third party
investors. The ideal securitization plan would offer enough benefits to
LDC debtors, creditor banks and third party investors so that all parties
would support the scheme. An analysis of two proposed securitization
plans, one which has already commenced and one which is still on the
drawing boards, will help explain the process in greater detail.

3. This secrecy is due to the competition among the various investment banks to be
first to implement a feasible plan. The winner of this race could potentially make a fortune
in commissions and thus all parties are hesitant to reveal the details of their proposals.
4. See Truell & Schwartz, Drexel's Milken Is Trying to Find a Lode in Latin Debt,

Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1987, at 6, col. 1. As of July, 1987 approximately five billion dollars
of LDC loans had been converted into equity since the programs began in 1985. The main
LDC beneficiaries of such swaps have been Chile, which had eliminated about $2.5 billion
of its debts through debt equity swaps; and Mexico, which had approved $1.7 billion to be
eliminated through swaps. Fierman, Fast Buck in Latin Loan Swaps,

at 91-92.
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II. Various Securitization Plans
A.

THE MORGAN GUARANTY/MEXICAN

PLAN

(THE MORGAN PLAN)

Morgan Guaranty Trust Company announced a securitization plan dealing with Mexican debt at the end of 1987. 5 Although the plan received
much publicity and was hailed as a new approach to the debt crisis, 6 the
results of the plan turned out to be relatively disappointing for reasons
which will be discussed below. The Mexican Plan consisted of an offer
(Invitation) by the Mexican Government to hold an auction in which banks
holding Mexican debt could voluntarily submit bids for the purpose of
7
exchanging their current debt for newly issued secured Mexican bonds.
The new bonds would be secured by twenty year zero-coupon (no payments made until maturity) U.S. Treasury bonds held in escrow at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 8 Mexico planned to buy as much as
ten billion dollars of the U.S. bonds for securitization purposes, for which
it would pay approximately two billion dollars. 9 Mexico would be able to
purchase the U.S. Treasury bonds at a steep discount off the face value
because the bonds would pay no interest, but would return full face value
on the maturity date. The principal of the newly issued Mexican bonds
would be payable in twenty years (at the same time as the maturity of
the U.S. Treasury bonds). I° Interest payments on the Mexican bonds
would be made semi-annually at the rate of 1.625 percentage points per
annum over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). This interest
rate is slightly higher than the rate of 0.8125 percentage points per annum
over LIBOR which Mexico currently pays on its external bank loans.12
Mexico accepted bids for the bonds according to the amount of discount
each bank was willing to offer on its currently held debt. 13 Thus, the
greater the discount a bank offered, the greater the probability that Mexico

5. Invitation from Gustavo Petrocelli, Minister of Finance and Public Credit of the
United Mexican States to the Banks Party to Mexico's Public Sector Restructure and New
Restructure Agreements and 1983 and 1984 New Money Agreements to Exchange Existing
Indebtedness For United Mexican States Collateralized Floating Rate Bonds Due 2008 (Jan.
18, 1988) [hereinafter Invitation].
6. See Farnsworth, Debt Policy in Transition, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1987, at A1, col. 1.
7. Invitation, supra note 5, sec. I.
8. Id. sec. 1, I.A & lI.B.
9. Id. sec. I.

10. Id. sec. 11.
II. Id.
12. Guenther, Here Are Main Points of Planfor Mexico to Reduce Its Debt by Billions
of Dollars, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
13. Invitation, supra note 5, sec. III.B.
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would accept its offer. 14 For instance, a bank which was willing to exchange one dollar worth of old debt for sixty cents of the new bonds
(sixty cents on the dollar or a forty percent discount) would prevail over
a bank which offered to exchange one dollar worth of old debt for eighty
cents of new debt (eighty cents on the dollar or a twenty percent discount).
At the time of the proposal, Mexican debt was worth only approximately
fifty cents on the dollar in the secondary loan market (where creditors
attempt to sell their debt for cash). 15 Mexico hoped it would receive bids
6
in this range.'
Thus, for the cost of two billion dollars, Mexico planned to buy a ten
billion dollar United States zero-coupon bond that could then be exchanged for twenty billion dollars of the principal of Mexico's currently
outstanding external bank debt. Unfortunately, the auction did not go as
planned. According to the results, Mexico agreed to issue only $2.56
billion in new bonds in exchange for $3.67 billion of its old debt, with
Mexico accepting an average bid price of approximately seventy cents on
the dollar. 17 Despite the supposed failure of the Morgan Plan, it offers
numerous examples of some of the benefits that must be offered, as well
as the problems which must be avoided, if a securitization plan is to be
effective in attempting to resolve the debt crisis.
1. The Morgan Plan from the Creditor Banks' Perspective
Despite the fact that as a result of the Morgan Plan participating creditor
banks will have to take a substantial loss on their existing loans, it should
be remembered that any solution to the debt crisis will most likely oblige
the creditor banks to suffer some losses. Even the most optimistic observers agree that it is unlikely that the majority of LDC debtors will be
able to fully repay their loans. Thus, unless the governments of the creditor
banks are willing to "bail them out," a scenario that is unlikely to occur
at least in the United States, 18 the banks will eventually have to take
some sort of loss on their loans.
In exchange for the losses borne by the banks whose bids were accepted, the banks will receive various benefits. First, the banks will be

14. Id.
15. Evans, NewDebtsforOld-Andthe SwapperIsKing, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 72.

16. Bennett, New Way Offered to Relieve Crisis In 3-World Debt, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30,
1987, at AI, col. 6.
17. Bennett, Lesson on Mexican Debt, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1988, at 35, col. 1, at 46,
col. 4.
18. Truell & Murray, Debt Breakthrough, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1987, at 1, col. 1, at 6,
col. 3. ("U.S. government officials reject charges the [Morgan] plan is a Treasury bailout
of Mexico or U.S. banks" as the United States will not lose any money as a result of the
plan).
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receiving a higher interest rate than that which was payable on their old
loans.1 9 In addition, assuming the new bonds are relatively risk free (a
highly disputed assumption as will be noted below), the banks will be
receiving more for their old debt as a result of this plan than they would
have received on the open market. Thus, the banks will receive seventy
cents on the dollar as result of the Morgan Plan rather than the fifty cents
20
on the dollar that they might have received on the secondary market.
In addition, the principal of the new bonds is secured by U.S. Treasury
bonds, which will be held by the Collateral Agent, Morgan Guaranty, at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York City, and cannot be transferred
out of the Federal Reserve Bank except upon payment or purchase and
cancellation of the bonds by Mexico. 2 1 If upon the maturity date Mexico
does not pay off the full face value of its bonds, the proceeds of the U.S.
Treasury bonds shall be remitted directly to the Fiscal Agent, Morgan
Guaranty, for payment to the Mexican bondholders. 22 Thus, the banks
are not only receiving a more secure instrument as compared to the current
Mexican loans, but they will not have to worry about enforcing payment
of the principal upon maturity.
Moreover, to the extent of Mexican debt that they hold in the form of
the new bonds, the banks will not be subject to as much pressure to
provide new money loans to the Mexican Government or to renegotiate
the terms of the bonds. 23 Aside from the language in the Invitation, Mexico's Minister of Finance and Public Credit specifically stated, "[t]hat
neither the Bonds nor any indebtedness tendered and accepted in exchange therefore will be included in the base amount for determining any
future requests that Mexico may make to its commercial bank creditors
generally." 24 Although bondholders might always be subject to informal
pressure from the Mexican Government to make new loans (e.g., by
Mexico's threatening to default on interest payments of the new bonds),
especially if the bonds remain in the hands of the banks as opposed to
19. See supra notes II & 12 and accompanying text.
20. Supra notes 14 & 15.
21. Invitation, supra note 5, sec. II.B.
22. Id.
23. Id. sec. I & III.B. Under current loan agreements, the banks are under no legal
obligation to provide the LDC debtors with the new money but nevertheless have often
done so for fear of the debtors defaulting on their interest payments. Such action would
have forced the banks to write down these loans as a loss and suffer the resulting consequence
of loss in annual profits and thus loss in value of stock. Defaults on the part of the LDC
debtors might also cause a collapse of the world banking system. See Mudge, Sovereign
Debt Restructuring, in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING 85-92 (1984); R. DALE & R. MATTIONE, MANAGING GLOBAL DEBT 42 (1983).

24. Letter from Gustavo Petrocelli, Minister of Finance and Public Credit of the United
Mexican States to the Banks Party to Mexico's Public Sector Restructure Agreements and
1983 and 1984 New Money Agreements, accompanying Invitation, supra note 5.
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the bonds being sold to third parties, at least the bondholders have some
formal support for their refusal to either provide new money or renegotiate
the terms of the bonds. In addition, the bondholders cannot be threatened
with nonpayment of principal if they refuse to lend any new money to
25
Mexico because Mexico will not retain possession of the collateral.
Finally, because the creditor banks will be receiving bonds that are
backed by U.S. Treasury bonds, the banks' loans portfolios will be much
more flexible since there should be a substantial market for the Mexican
bonds. Although a secondary market exists for Mexican debt, there is
currently little demand for such debt because of the risks associated with
it and the difficulty in evaluating such risks and hence, the value of the
debt. 26 Because the principal of the new Mexican bonds will be secured
by a risk free asset, it will obviously be a less risky investment and thus
valuation of the bonds should be somewhat easier. 27 Thus, the bonds
should be more negotiable if the banks decide to attempt to sell the
instruments .28
Despite the advantages that may accrue to the creditor banks as a result
of the innovations of the Morgan Plan, clearly the Plan is beset with
weaknesses from the banks' point of view. These weaknesses account for
the disappointing bids received by the Mexican Government and the poor
results of the debt auction. The most obvious disadvantage to the banks
participating in the Morgan Plan is that they will be facing substantial
losses, on the average at least 30 percent of the face value of the loans
they submitted in exchange for the bonds. 29 Although it is obvious to
most parties concerned that it is unlikely that Mexico will ever be able
to repay its external debt obligations in full, this plan forces the banks to
"accept the idea that they will lose heavily on their Latin American loans." 3°
In addition, regarding the creditor banks' overall LDC debt, including
that which is not swapped, the accounting consequences of the banks'
swapping part of their old Mexican debt for the new bonds and accepting
a 30 percent loss is not clear. Currently there are no "generally accepted
accounting principals" exactly on point. Morgan Guaranty officials and
25. Invitation, supra note 5, sec. I1.B.
26. See supra note 15, at 73; note 18, at I, col. I. Some estimate that only $10 billion
of LDC debt has been traded on the secondary market since its inception. Id.
27. Supra note 16, at D6, col. 6; note 18, at 1, col. I.

28. Id.
29. See supra note 17, at 35, col. 1. These losses may be set off against the banks' loan
loss reserves that have been set aside for such an occurrence, thus avoiding a loss in current
earnings. If the banks wish to increase their loan loss reserves, however, as will probably
be the case should these reserves substantially decrease due to the debt exchange, the funds
for such an action would have to be deducted from current earnings. See supra note 12, at
6, col. 2.
30. Bennett, supra note 16, at Al, col. 6.
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their accountants, Price Waterhouse, insist that banks which have only
submitted part of their Mexican portfolio in exchange for the new bonds
will not have to write down the value of the remaining part of their Mexican
debt, nor the amount of debt that the banks unsuccessfully offered to
swap at different discount levels. 3 1 Other accountants, however, including
one of Price Waterhouse's own partners, disagree. 32 These accountants
argue that if the banks that participated in the Plan accepted a 30 percent
loss on the Mexican debt that was to be exchanged for bonds, or even
implied that they would have been willing to do so as a result of rejected
bids, the banks themselves would be admitting that their Mexican debt
as a whole was worth 30 percent less than face value. Thus, these banks
33
should write down such a loss with respect to all their Mexican debt.
With respect to banks that hold large amounts of Mexican debt, such a
result could prove to be extremely damaging in terms of the banks' financial structure, as well as annual profits, and hence, the value of the
banks' stock. Due to this accounting uncertainty, it is possible that many
banks that were heavily exposed to Mexican debt were hesitant to submit
bids which offered any substantial discount. It should be noted that this
accounting risk will most likely exist in any securitization plan unless
clear regulations and "generally accepted accounting principles" indicate
otherwise.
In addition, a major problem with the Morgan plan from the creditor
banks' point of view is that although the principal of the new bonds will
be secured by U.S. Treasury bonds, the interest payments due on the
new bonds will not be secured in any way. 3 4 According to the terms of
the Invitation, although Mexico's failure to make timely interest payments
may trigger a default, this default gives the bondholders nothing more
35
than a right to have the bonds declared immediately due and payable.
Mexico's default on interest payments does not give rise to the conditions
required for default to occur under the collateral Pledge Agreement. 36
Thus, even if Mexico defaults on interest payments, the bondholders do
not have access to the collateral backing the face value of the bonds until
31. See Invitation, supra note 5, app. Il, Letter from Price Waterhouse at 7-11.
32. Richard Hammer, national director of international tax services for Price Waterhouse
of New York has been quoted as saying that "it's obvious [that] if any part of a portfolio
is traded all the loans must be marked to market." Supra note 15, at 93.
33. See supra note 12; note 15, at 73, 91-93. The process whereby a sale of part of a
bank's particular country debt would force the bank to write down the value of the remaining
part of the country debt not sold is known as "contamination." Id. For an excellent summary
of the general accounting issues involved regarding the value of the creditor banks' LDC

loans, see supra note 2, at 25-32.
34. Invitation, supra note 5, sec. II.B.
35. Id. sec. I1.A.
36. Id.
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the bonds actually mature in the year 2008. 3 7 If Mexico chooses not to
pay off the bonds if they are declared immediately due and payable, the
only alternatives left to the bondholders would be to seek recourse through
the judicial system. This option, however, is beset with problems of
enforcement.

38

Morgan Guaranty officials have argued that Mexico has an excellent
record with respect to making timely interest payments on its bond obligations, and therefore, creditor banks and potential third party investors
should not have been overly concerned with the fact that the interest
payments on the new bonds are not secured. 39 This past credit history is
relevant in attempting to valuate the bonds. However, in light of the size
of Mexico's outstanding external debt, and the related burden it is placing
on the Mexican economy,40 the record of timely interest payments in the

past was probably not enough of a guarantee to induce the bidding banks
to offer discounts equivalent to the supposed market value of their Mexican debt. Due to the fact that the bonds do not mature for twenty years
and the interest payments on these bonds are higher than the interest

Mexico pays on its current bank debt, a substantial amount of debt will
not be secured. Because the bidding banks were already taking a chance
of incurring a sizeable initial loss on their loans if their bids were accepted
by the Mexican Government, it is understandable that many banks may
have wanted a fully secured instrument (both interest and principal to be
secured) in exchange for incurring such losses. Otherwise, the banks were
taking the risk of a "double hit," incurring a loss during the initial exchange with Mexico and another loss upon sale of the bonds to third party
37. Id. sec. 11.B.
38. Bondholders could probably obtain a favorable judgment in U.S. courts, which would
order Mexico to make the payments due on the bonds. That is to say, there would be no

problem with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because in the text of the Invitation,
Mexico waives any claims to foreign immunity for purposes of bond payments. Invitation,
supra note 5, sec. ILA; see also Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
665 F. Supp. 323, 335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Jackson v. Peoples Republic of China, 550 F.
Supp. 869, 873 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (judgment set aside on other grounds), aff'd, 794 F.2d 1490
(lIth Cir. 1986), where the courts held that the sale of bonds in the United States by a
sovereign government constituted a commercial exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Despite the possibility of obtaining favorable judgments in U.S. courts, however, even if Mexico possessed enough foreign exchange to make such payments, it is
doubtful that it would comply with the court orders unless diplomatic pressure was brought
to bear by the United States Government. It should also be noted that according to the
Invitation, "Mexican law provides that a Mexican court may not issue an order of execution
or order of attachment against Mexico." Invitation, supra note 5, sec. II.A.
39. See J. P. MORGAN, THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES COLLATERALIZED FLOATING
RATE BONDS DUE 2008-A VALUATION APPROACH (memo prepared for prospective bidders), Feb. 17, 1988, at 2.
40. See generally Bailey & Watkins, Mexico's Dilemma, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1987, at
A19, col. 2.
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investors. 4 Indeed, offers have already been made to purchase the new
Mexican bonds at substantially less than their face value, thus indicating
risk that
that third party investors believe that there is a fair amount of
42
Mexico will default on at least some of its interest payments.
Moreover, the fact that the interest payments are not secured has numerous other ramifications. First, the Mexican Government still retains
a weapon (in the form of threatening not to make timely interest payments)
to pressure bondholders into lending it new money. Although Mexico has
43
guaranteed it would not take such action vis-A-vis the new bondholders,
if faced with an economic emergency, one cannot be sure that the Mexican
Government would not attempt to obtain new money from any and all
possible sources. More importantly, because of the risk associated with
the interest payments, the bonds will become much more difficult to
valuate. Investors will have to engage in a sovereign risk analysis in order
to attempt to estimate the likelihood of Mexico's defaulting on these
interest payments. In general, sovereign risk analysis is a very complicated and inexact science which is more complicated than analyzing purely
private domestic risk. 44 Despite the fact that the new bonds will at least
be more negotiable than the current bank loans, the valuation difficulty
will reduce the negotiability of the bonds, thus making them less valuable
to the banks and potential investors.
One should not note that there are two other possible impediments to
negotiability of the new bonds that reduces their value from the perspective of some creditor banks. First, all bondholders, including any trans45
ferees, must be registered with Mexico's agent, Morgan Guaranty.
Although this requirement may have been incorporated into the terms of
the bonds in order to insure that the potential bondholders comply with
Security Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements regarding subsequent transfer of the bonds, 46 the registration requirement allows Mexico
to identify the bondholders at will, and thus, possibly pressure them to
either renegotiate the terms of the bonds or provide new money loans to

41. Bennett, supra note 17, at 46, col. 4.
42. Id.
43. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.

supra note 23, at 19-24; see generally S. HEFFERMAN,
(1986) and Barnett, The Euromoney Country Risk Ratings,
353. For a more specific discussion of the problems associated
with sovereign risk analysis within this article, see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying
text.
45. Invitation, supra note 5, sec. I ("The bonds will be issued only in fully registered
form, without coupons, and will not be convertible directly or indirectly into bearer form").
44. See R.

DALE

& R.

MATTIONE,

SOVEREIGN RISK ANALYSIS
EUROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at

46. See Invitation, supra note 5, sec. ILA; see also 17 C.F.R. 230.144 (1988) (rule 144).

Rule 144 itself may impose further restrictions on the negotiability of the bonds. See L.
Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 336-76 (1988).
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Mexico. Granted, the bonds could be held by holding companies or trusts
so that Mexico could not identify the true holders; however, this would
result in making the resale of the bonds to third parties more complicated,
thus increasing the transaction costs that the banks would have to bear
upon resale. Clearly, if the bonds were issued in bearer form, they would
be more negotiable and more valuable to both banks and potential investors.
In addition, all transfers of the bonds (which must be undertaken through
the "registrar," Morgan Guaranty acting as Mexico's agent) are "subject
to reasonable requirements of Mexico." 47 Thus, should the Mexican Government decide it wants to limit transfer, possibly to bring pressure on
bondholders to provide new money or renegotiate the terms of the bonds,
it has the power to do so at least temporarily. Although such reasons for
blocking transfers of the bonds may be judged by the courts as an unreasonable requirement, the mere possibility that Mexico could delay
transferability and increase the costs of such transfers once again decreases the value of the bonds to both the creditor banks and potential
third party investors.
2. The Morgan Planfrom the LDC Debtors' Perspective

Clearly the Morgan Plan offers Mexico many advantages, which most
LDC debtors in similar economic situations could also enjoy. 48 First, the
plan allows Mexico to capture the discount that is being offered on Mexican debt in the secondary market. Indeed, this was one of Mexico's main
49
objectives when it asked Morgan Guaranty to formulate such a plan.
When a creditor bank currently sells or swaps its debt on the secondary
market, it is usually the new holder of the debt who obtains the benefit
of any discount. Mexico is still left with the burden of being obligated to
service, and supposedly repay, the full amount of its external debt. As a
result of the Morgan Plan, Mexico assumes the position of the private
investor by purchasing or swapping its own debt, thereby capturing the
discount that the third party investor would normally receive. Aside from
the fact that Mexico will be reducing the overall amount of debt it is
supposed to ultimately repay, it will also be substantially reducing the
amount of current interest it must repay, thus giving the country an immediate economic benefit. Although Mexico will be paying a higher rate
of interest on the new bonds, as compared to the interest rate on the old
47. Invitation, supra note 5, sec. II.A.
48. Brazil has expressed strong interest in participating in a similar plan. See Truell &

Murray, supra note 18, at 6, col. I. Brazil may have problems with this particular Plan,
however, due to the initial outlay of foreign exchange which is required. See id. at 1, col.
I; see also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
49. Bennett, Morgan Bank Outlines Its Mexican Debt Plan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1987,

at D3, col. 1.
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bank loans, 50 the amount of principal on which interest payments will be
calculated will be reduced. This will reduce Mexico's overall external
debt servicing. Thus, had Mexico swapped ten billion dollars of new debt
for twenty billion dollars of old debt as initially planned, "The swap could
[have] save[d] Mexico $18 billion in interest payments over the next twenty
51
years, or about $900 million a year."
A second advantage Mexico will receive as result of the debt swap is
that once the bank debt is converted into the more liquid bond instrument,
Mexico may be able to recapture any further decline in the value of its
debt. Should the bonds drop in value, Mexico could directly, or if required
for public relation reasons through an intermediary, repurchase its own
bonds at the newly discounted value. This is exactly what many Latin
American debtor nations did after World War II when their sovereign
bonds had dropped in value due to the nations' inability to make payments
on the bonds. 52 Theoretically, Mexico could have taken such action before
the Morgan Plan was implemented, "but in the illiquid secondary market
for debt, a country buys back debt that has travelled through four or five
middlemen who raise the price from, say, 60 percent [of face value] to 80
percent [of face value] by the time it reaches the debtor country's central
53
bank."
In addition, the Morgan Plan is advantageous to Mexico because of the
nature of the debt swap transaction, a bidding process in which Mexico
was free to reject any bids it did not believe offered a large enough discount
on the old debt. 54 Although this provision gave Mexico a certain amount
of freedom in deciding what price it would accept for the old debt, it may
also have partially accounted for the disappointing results of the Plan
because, from the creditor banks' perspective, the transaction itself may
have appeared to have been too one sided. Whereas the creditor banks'
were bound by their bids once they were accepted, 55 Mexico was free to
reject any bid. 56 Because the banks would necessarily suffer some sort
of loss in the exchange of bank debt for the new bond, it might have been
more appropriate to allow the banks to negotiate the amount of that loss
with Mexico, rather than giving Mexico an all or nothing power to accept

50. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
51. Guenther, supra note 12, at 6, col. 2.
52. See Sachs, LDC Debt: The Secondary Market, the Banks and New Investment in
Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 41, 46 (1986).

53. Osborn, Can This Dream Come True?, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 74, 79.
54. Invitation, supra note 5, sec. III.B.
55. "Upon acceptance by Mexico, each Bid, to the extent accepted, will, together with
the Terms of Bid and Exchange, constitute a contract between Mexico and the Bidder." Id.
sec. III.A.
56. Id. sec. III.B.
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or reject the banks' bids. The unilateral nature of this swap bidding was
mitigated to some extent by the fact that each creditor bank could make
five bids, 57 thus giving each bank the option to make five different offers
of discount for the new bonds. However, it would still seem that negotiations would have been more productive than a bidding process, because
the banks could have voiced reasonable objections to the swap, which
58
might have led Mexico to accept bids which offered lower discounts.
Because of the nature of the bidding process, some banks may have felt
that they were bullied into taking large losses, and for that reason may
have rebelled against offering the discount levels that the Mexican Gov59
ernment was hoping to obtain.
As is indicated above, had the Morgan Plan achieved the projected
results, there would have been very few disadvantages from the Mexican
perspective. The most obvious difficulty facing Mexico would have been
paying the large amount of foreign exchange which would have been
required to purchase the U.S. Treasury bonds. Of Mexico's total foreign
exchange reserves of approximately fifteen billion dollars, as of the end
of September 1987, potentially two billion of this would have been spent
on the U.S. bonds. 60 Although the long-term benefits would have made
the expenditure worthwhile in the short-term, such a large expenditure
of foreign exchange during a period of economic austerity might have

created strong domestic political opposition to the Morgan Plan. 6 1 In
addition, it should be noted that this plan has limited applicability to other
57. Id. sec. III.A.

58. For instance, under a plan whereby the IMF would take a role in a debt swap plan
similar to the Morgan Plan, Dr. Arjun Sengupta has suggested that the swap rates would
be determined not by the market but through negotiations in which the IMF, the debtor
country, and the creditor banks participate. See Farnsworth, I.M.F. Studying Plan to Ease
Debt Burden, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1988, at D2, col. 5.
59. This pressure could be analogized to the pressure shareholders feel when they are
the recipients of a two-tiered tender offer. Because the shares of a company typically drop
in value after a successful takeover bid, informed shareholders will generally want to tender
their shares, regardless of whether they believe the offer price reflects the company's full
value, for fear of being left holding the less valuable shares. See R. CLARK, CORPORATE
LAW 545-46 (1986). This same situation could be said to apply to the Morgan Plan rega;ding
the Mexican debt. Because the new form of debt would be securitized, it would probably
be paid off before the old debt and hence would become more valuable than the old debt
held by nonparticipants in the swap. Thus the old debt would in a sense be junior to the
new debt. See Osborn, supra note 53, at 75-76. Taking into account that only a limited
amount of the old debt would be exchanged for the new debt (maximum of $20 billion of
old debt for $10 billion of new debt) and assuming that the banks knew they were going to
have to suffer large losses at some point in the future, it would seem that the banks, like
shareholders in the tender offer analogy, would rush to be sure that they were included in
the exchange of old debt for new debt. This did not occur-quite possibly because the banks
resented being pressured into taking large losses.
60. Bennett, supra note 16, at D6, col. 4.
61. See id.
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LDC debtors due to the large initial outlay of foreign exchange that is
required to purchase the U.S. Treasury bonds. Although some LDC debtors do have sizeable foreign exchange reserves, numerous others such as
Argentina and Brazil are not in nearly as strong a position as Mexico in
terms of their foreign exchange reserves. 62 Even with regard to Mexico,
it must be understood that although the Morgan Plan could have potentially helped Mexico to substantially reduce its debt burden, clearly the
Plan did not, even in its most optimistic potential outcome, offer a final
solution to Mexico's debt problem. Considering that the total amount of
Mexico's external debt obligations were approximately 108 billion dollars
as of 1987,63 the Morgan Plan only would have potentially reduced Mexico's external debt burden by approximately eighteen percent.
Although the results of the Morgan Guaranty Plan were somewhat
disappointing, the Plan had one major beneficial consequence for the
evolution of future debt securitization plans vis-A-vis Mexico and other
LDC debtors. Because the United States Treasury participated in the
Plan and allowed Mexico to purchase a special zero coupon bond, it would
seem that the United States Government has indirectly agreed to the
concept that LDC debtors should receive at least partial forgiveness on
their external debt obligations. 64 This policy change indicates that U.S.
creditor banks probably cannot hope for a government bailout with respect
to their potential losses since the U.S. Treasury is participating in a plan
which forces the banks to realize substantial losses. Thus, the banks will
have to prepare for taking larger losses in the future, which should make
them more flexible in terms of accepting future debt -trategies that turn
largely on the amount of discount the banks will be willing to offer on
their current sovereign debt holdings.

B.

THE JUNK BOND PLAN

Much time and effort has been spent on attempting to take LDC debt
and turn it into high-yield securities, or so-called "junk bonds." 65 Junk
bonds became a popular financial instrument in the United States in the

62. See Truell & Murray, supra note 18, at 6, col. 4-5, Whereas Mexico had foreign
exchange reserves of $11,960 billion as of mid-1987, Argentina possessed only $1,488 in
foreign exchange reserves and Brazil only $4,499. 1 COUNTRY REPORT-MExico app. I
(1988); 1 COUNTRY REPORT-ARGENTINA app. 1 (1988); 1 COUNTRY REPORT-BRAZIL app.
1 (1988).

63. Riding, supra note I, at D8, cols. 5-6.
64. See Farnsworth, supra note 6, at D3, col. I.
65. Attempts at producing an attractive and feasible repackaging of LDC debt are being
undertaken by among others, Salomon Brothers, Merril Lynch, Citibank. Shearson Lehman,
First Boston, First Interstate, Drexel Burnham, Schroder, and Bankers Trust. Osborn, supra
note 53, at 74.
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early 1980's largely due to the efforts of Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham Lambert. Milken discovered that investors were willing to buy bonds,
issued by riskier companies, as long as the return on the bonds was great
enough to offset the extra risk taken by investors. There is nothing inherently radical about this proposal. It is in line with conventional market
theories that investors will be willing to take more risk if they are offered
what they believe to be an appropriate level of return. 66 In general, yields
on junk bonds have averaged anywhere between 9 and 17 percent, depending on the risk that the company will default on repayment of either
interest or principal. 67 The market for junk bonds has grown very rapidly
in the past decade, from about $1.5 billion worth of lesser-quality bonds
issued in 1978 to $7.4 billion in 1983 to $48 billion in 1984.68
The concept behind turning LDC debt into junk bonds, as is the case
with most securitization plans, revolves around the banks' willingness to
sell their LDC debt at a substantial discount, and therefore, take a sizeable
loss on the loans. Although it is obvious to interested parties that the
majority of LDC debt will never be repaid in full, if the return on such
high risk debt is great enough, there are investors who would be willing
to purchase the unwanted debt from the banks. 69 For instance, if a bank
held large amounts of Mexican debt, which was hypothetically valued by
the market at fifty cents on the dollar, and such debt was paying 10 percent
annual interest, a potential purchaser of this debt would receive an annual
return of 20 percent on his investment as compared to the approximate
8 percent annual return offered on U.S. Treasury Bonds and the average
70
13.5 percent annual return offered on domestic junk bonds.
Whether or not this specific amount of potential return would be enough
to induce an investor to buy the repackaged Mexican debt would depend
on the investor's estimation of the likelihood of Mexico's defaulting on
its payments of interest or principal. This estimate will depend on the
accuracy of information available to the market regarding Mexico's financial and political situation. 7 1 Taking into account the current discounts
66. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between risk and return, see R.

BREALEY

& S. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 117-63 (1984).

67. Worthy, The Coming Defaults in Junk Bonds, FORTUNE, Mar. 16, 1987, at 27 (1987).
68. Id.
69. There are always investors who are willing to take greater risks if they have a chance
of high returns. For example consider one of the following reasons for the success of domestic
corporate junk bonds. "Junk bonds yield 3 percent and more over treasury bonds. Investors
got addicted to high yields back when they could get 15 percent on their money market
funds. But with money market yields down to 7 percent, investors are showing withdrawal
symptoms. Junk bonds are the methadone." McGough, Reaching for Yield, FORBES,
Sept. 16, 1985 at 91 (1985).
70. The Myth of Junk, 299 ECONOMIST 23 (1986) (quoting a Wharton Business School
study).
71. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems
associated with sovereign risk analysis.
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that the creditor banks are willing to offer on the sale of their debt, an
analysis of current potential returns to investors in LDC junk bonds illustrates that the creditor banks will have to be willing to take much larger
losses on their LDC debt before any junk bond scheme can achieve success. 7 2 At the current levels of discount, the potential return to LDC junk
bond investors simply does not justify their taking the very large risk that
the LDC debtors will default on either their interest or principal payments. 73 In order to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the junk
bond scheme, however, let us assume for the moment that the banks were
willing to take the required losses so that investors would find it worthwhile to invest in LDC junk bonds.
1. Junk Bonds from the Creditor Banks' Perspective
As is the case with most securitization plans, the banks do not have all
that much to gain from the junk bond plan because of the amount of
money they will lose. Creditor banks are going to lose a fairly substantial
amount of money as the result of any resolution to the debt crisis that
realistically takes into account the LDC debtors' inability to make full
repayment on their loans. Once the banks accept this fact, however, it
will become clear to them that the junk bonds plan offers the banks various
benefits that other securitization schemes lack.
First, if the LDC junk bonds were to be issued in bearer form, as would
most likely be the case if these instruments are to be easily tradeable on
secondary markets, the banks would probably be relieved of any pressure
to provide new money to the debtor nations. Once the bonds are sold to
private investors, the banks will have immediately cut off all formal relationships with the LDC debtors. Although the banks will initially take
a heavy loss when they sell the LDC debt to private investors, if the banks
simultaneously sell all of the particular LDC's debt they will be secure
from any further exposure to default by the LDC debtors. 74 Some ob-

72. The results of the Mexican securitization proposal'discussed above showed that
most banks on the average were willing to only offer discounts of approximately 30 percent.
See Bennett, supra note 16. Although the junk bond scheme will offer various advantages

to banks that the Mexican Plan did not offer, principally that the creditor banks can in one
step get rid of their sovereign debt once and for all (see below for further details), even

were the banks willing to sell their debt at its "market value," the return would still not be
enough to attract potential investors. Mexican debt was trading at around 56 in August 1987,
which gives a yield of approximately 14 percent. Evans, supra note 15, at 79.
73. With current returns on U.S. corporate junk bonds reaching as high as 17 percent (see
R. BREALEY & S. MEYERS, supra note 66), the LDC junk bonds, which are viewed as being
more risky, would have to offer higher returns to be competitive. Some analysts believe that

the banks would have to offer discount rates of between 50 percent and 70 percent to produce
junk bonds yielding 16 percent to 20 percent. Evans, supra note 15, at 79.
74. See F. BERGSTEN, W. CLINE & J. WILLIAMSON supra note 2, at 123; Osborn, supra
note 53, at 85. In particular this policy is attractive to smaller banks and banks that only
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servers argue, however, that if the old debt is converted into bearer bonds,
because the LDC debtors will have no way to identify the new holders
of the debt, the only parties to whom the LDCs can turn to for new money
will continue to be the banks. 75 Thus, the banks will still be under pressure
to provide new money to the LDC debtors, and therefore, continue the
unwanted relationship. This argument only seems to hold true, however,
in the scenario where the creditor banks retain some of the specific LDC
debt, and thus continue to be subject to threats of default on this debt.
If a bank sells all of its LDC debt to investors, the LDC really has no
76
weapons with which it may pressure the bank to lend it new money.
Also, it should be noted that a potential problem may arise regarding
the banks' ability to sell their LDC debt to junk bond investors since
many LDC debtors have covenants in their loans which forbid the banks
to transfer the loans to non-financial institutions (i.e., institutions or investors which could not be pressured into providing new money to the LDC
debtors). 77 This problem might be sidestepped by creating a fund of LDC
debt that would issue certificates to interested investors. This would probably involve some sort of continued bank participation, however, and
force the banks to continue their unwanted relationship with the LDC
debtors. 78 In addition, such a scheme would probably increase the transaction costs of the sale of the debt, thereby making it less attractive to
the banks who would have to bear these costs.
Another possible benefit, which the banks might obtain by selling their
LDC debt holdings to junk bond investors, is that they would be contributing to the creation of a liquid market for the debt. If the banks offer
a discount large enough to attract junk bond investors, a market will be
created in which there is actually a demand for the LDC debt. 79 By
creating a liquid market for the debt, the value of the debt remaining in
the banks' possession would increase in value because this debt would

have slight exposure to LDC debt. These banks are more willing to take the losses than the
larger and more exposed banks if such losses allow them to walk away from the LDC debt
problem once and for all.
75. See Osborn, supra note 53, at 85.
76. It should be noted however that it is questionable if any secondary market could
absorb a bulk sale of the LDC debt by the banks with large amounts of such debt. Thus
with respect to the banks with large exposure to LDC debt, the above concern becomes
more valid.
77. Id.
78. Id. For instance the banks might have to play middleman between the investors and
the LDC debtors or even worse become the guarantors of the loans should the LDC debtors
default on their payments of interest or principal.
79. This is in contrast to the current secondary market for LDC debt in which there is
very little activity apart from sales between banks which are trying to diversify their LDC
loan portfolios and the debt-equity market. See generally Evans, supra note 15, at 72-74.
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become much more negotiable, and therefore, much more attractive to
investors. 80 Thus, if banks sold only a portion of their debt at a large
discount for the purposes of creating negotiable junk bonds, they might
be able to recoup some of the initial loss by selling the remaining debt at
less of a discount. It should be remembered, however, that by undertaking
a strategy of incremental sales, the banks would then lose the benefit of
immediately cutting off their relationships with the LDCs in order to avoid
being subject to pressure for new money loans.
A final comment needs to be made concerning the creditor banks' view
of the creation of an LDC junk bond market. If a large market for such
debt is created, it will become much easier to valuate the loans which are
retained by the banks. Although this will make the loans more negotiable
and thus more valuable, this may also create pressure to force banks to
write down losses on any remaining holdings of the same LDC debt.
Although such action currently is not required, 8 1 the creation of a large
secondary market in which the LDC debt is more easily valuated may
bring pressure on the banks to change their accounting techniques and
recognize the loss in value of the loans they still possess. 82 Thus, some
creditor banks would lose the freedom to write down losses at their will,
that is, when they actually sell the loans for a loss.
2. Junk Bonds from the LDC Debtors' Perspective

The LDC debtor nations have little to gain from the junk bond scheme
proposed above unless, in the course of the repackaging of their debt,
some sort of immediate debt relief or new resources are transferred to
the debtor nation. Thus, in the words of an official of the central bank of
Chile, "Securitization is good for us only if it contributes to the channelling
of new resources, new lending and new investment into our country." 83
As the above scheme stands, no new resources are immediately transferred to the LDC debtors, not even in the form of debt relief. Granted
the amount of principal that the debtors eventually would have to repay
might be substantially reduced due to the lower face values of the new

80. Osborn, supra note 53, at 85.
81. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
82. See Rogers, Wall Street Eyes an Ultimate Junk Bond,

FORTUNE,

Feb. 3, 1986, at

99. This would be consistent with the doctrine of "conservatism" and the idea that with
regard to marketable securities, which the LDC debt might be considered if it could potentially be converted into negotiable junk bonds, they should be carried on a company's
balance sheet at the lower of cost or market value. See also D. HERWITZ, ACCOUNTING
FOR LAWYERS 201-02 (1980).
83. Wayne, On Stage: Wall Street's Newest Magic Show, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1987,

at F14, col. 6 (quoting Roberto C. Toso, financial representative in New York of the Central
Bank of Chile).
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junk bonds. 84 The overall amount of interest that the LDC debtors would
have to pay, however, would not be reduced. Thus, the debtors would
not receive any short-term relief that would reduce the burden of the
loans and allow the LDC debtors to spend their scarce resources on
development rather than loan servicing. 8 5 Almost all discounts that the
banks would be willing to offer in order to unload their LDC debt would
be transferred to the private investors in the form of lower face values
on the bonds, thereby returning higher yields to investors. Despite that
the banks would have suffered serious losses, the LDC debtors would
not be any better off in the short term since the immediate burden of their
loans would remain the same.
It seems clear that the above proposed plan will not obtain the support
of the LDC debtors unless somehow at least part of the discounts offered
by the creditor banks can be immediately recaptured by the LDC debtors.
Possibly, if the discounts that the banks are willing to offer are great
enough, part of such discounts could be given to the LDC debtors in the
form of reduced interest payments. 86 This outcome seems impractical,
however, as it would depend on the banks' willingness to suffer even
greater losses on the loans. Unless the LDC debtors could somehow
87
threaten to interfere with or block the junk bond conversion scheme,
thus making it worthwhile for the banks to transfer some of the discount
to the LDC debtors in the form of reduced interest payments, it is unlikely
that the debtors would be the beneficiaries of any substantial part of the
discounts that the banks would be offering investors.
3. Feasibility of the Junk Bond Scheme

The junk bond scheme concerning the creditor banks' LDC debt is
modeled on currently successful operations in which private U.S. companies sell high-risk securities to private investors. Thus, a comparison
84. See Evans, supra note 15, at 79. Thus, for instance, a bank loan with a face value
of $100,000 and paying an interest rate of 10 percent would be converted into a bond with
a face value of $50,000, reflecting the discount that the bank is offering, and paying a rate
of 20 percent. Eventually the LDC debtor would only have to repay $50,000 in principal,
but its current interest payments would remain the same.
85. See F. BERGSTEN, W. CLINE & J. WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 56-57.
86. See Evans, supra note 15, at 79.
87. For instance the debtors could attempt to enforce the covenants that prohibit the
transferral of the loans to non-financial institutions. "Mexico can stymie any repackaging
plan because it runs the registers on its debt and can therefore block transfers from banks
to bank investors." Osborn, supra note 53, at 75. Such actions would require the banks to
create a fund of LDC debt that would issue high yield certificates functionally equivalent
to junk bonds. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. This process would probably
increase the banks' transaction costs for implementing the junk bond scheme to the point
that it might be cheaper for the banks simply to transfer some of the discount to LDC
debtors rather than go through the process of creating the LDC fund.
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of the already existing junk bond operations and the proposed plans for
converting LDC debt into junk bonds should serve as a useful basis for
analyzing the feasibility of the LDC junk bond plan in terms of whether
private investors would actually purchase such instruments. In general,
because the issuer of the new bonds would be foreign sovereign governments, as opposed to private U.S. companies, the problems associated
with the LDC junk bond scheme become so much more complex that the
scheme seems to have little chance of success.
First, the problem arises of how investors will be able to valuate these
new LDC junk bonds so as to be able to decide whether the return they
are being offered is worth the risk associated with these instruments.
According to the efficient capital market hypothesis, "[als long as speculators exist junk bonds should be adequately priced by an efficient capital
market where potential investors can readily assess the risks associated
with this specialized type of investment and demand an adequate return." 88 With respect to existing junk bonds, investors are dealing with
known U.S. companies. Potential investors can relatively easily obtain
and assess financial statements dealing with the company's past and present economic record, study the market in which the company is involved,
and thereby make a relatively well informed estimate as to what are the
risks of the company's defaulting on the newly offered junk bond. In
addition, should there be a strong possibility that the issuing company
will file for bankruptcy, the investor should have enough information
available to make some sort of rough calculation as to what percentage
of its initial investment in the junk bond it will be able to recover as a
result of the bankruptcy proceedings. Obviously, most of the above estimates will be somewhat inaccurate, but they will give the investor the
ability to make an informed calculation regarding the worth of the junk
bond.
All of these estimates become much more complicated, if not impossible, when dealing with junk bonds issued by foreign governments because the risks associated with these LDC junk bonds cannot be readily
assessed. Thus, it is not surprising that most commercial bankers view
the LDC junk bond scheme with skepticism. "Commercial bankers say
their decades of experience with Latin loans tells them it is simplistic to
merely compare troubled countries with troubled companies." 89 First,
there are no financial statements which the investor can analyze. Granted
the investor can look at the nation's past and present economic indicators
such as GNP, inflation debt-service ratios, and the nation's history of
repayments of past foreign debts. Analysis of these indicators, however,
BREALEY & S. MEYERS, supra note 66, at 76.
89. Wayne, supra note 83, at F14, col. 1.

88. R.
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is often difficult due to a lack of easily accessible information and the
inability to accurately identify and analyze the wide range of international
and political economic factors that could influence the nation's economy. 90
In addition, because many of the debtor nations being dealt with have a
history of political instability, any investment decision will have to take
into account domestic political factors. 9 1 Analysis must take into account
both a possible change in governmental policies or a complete change in
the type of government itself, either of which may affect the ability or
willingness of the debtor nation to make timely payments on its junk
bonds.

92

Another difference between the U.S. corporate junk bonds and the
proposed LDC junk bonds, which makes risk analysis more difficult with
respect to the latter, is that there is much more uncertainty as to the
economic consequences should an LDC default on its junk bonds. If a
U.S. company defaults on its junk bonds, more than likely the company
is heading into bankruptcy. Should the company file for bankruptcy, there
exists an established mechanism whereby the remaining assets of the
93
company are distributed to creditors according to fixed procedures.
Thus, junk bond investors are able to make some predictions as to what
kinds of losses they will suffer should the company go bankrupt. This
analysis would not be possible, however, with respect to LDC junk bonds
because when a foreign government is unable to repay its loans it does
not go into bankruptcy. Because there is no formal mechanism which
governs a sovereign nation's actions when it cannot repay its loans, there
is no way for the junk bond investor to know what amount he will eventually receive, if anything, should the LDC debtor default.
Granted, the U.S. investor might bring a suit for full recovery in a U.S.
court, but obviously any judgment which bondholders receive will, as
mentioned above, be plagued with enforcement problems in the defaulting
nation. 94 Enforcement of the claim in the United States, through seizure
of the defaulting nation's assets, would similarly be unrealistic because
of both probable lack of adequate assets and the unwanted diplomatic

90. For a general discussion of sovereign risk analysis, see sources cited supra note 44.
91. For a general explanation of how banks consider these political factors, see Whiting,
Country Risk-Non-Economic Factors, in THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING HANDBOOK 85
(1983). Whiting comments that, -[u]nfortunately for the consumer, if not for the consultant,

the assessment of political risk is more art than science." Id.
92. For instance both the Governments of Czarist Russia and prerevolutionary China
had outstanding bonds on which the succeeding governments defaulted and which were
never paid despite suits brought by investors in this country. See Jackson, 550 F. Supp. at
871-72 and Carl Marks, 665 F. Supp. at 325-27.
93. See I I U.S.C. (Bankruptcy Code).
94. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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complications which would accompany any domestic enforcement of the
95
claim.
The problems associated with country risk analysis, as opposed to
corporate risk analysis, are by no means new to the financial world.
Indeed, these problems are partially responsible for the positions in which
the creditor banks currently find themselves vis-t-vis their LDC debt.
The difficulties associated with sovereign risk analysis, and thus the difficulties investors will encounter when trying to valuate the LDC junk
bonds, all point towards the fact that LDC junk bond investors will demand a higher rate of return than would be the case with respect to U.S.
96
corporate junk bonds of equivalent, but more measurable, risk.
The next question is whether banks will be willing to provide the discounts required so that their loans, when repackaged into LDC junk
bonds, will offer returns high enough to attract investors. Currently this
does not seem to be the case. As the results of the Morgan Plan illustrated,
the creditor banks were not willing to offer more than an average of a 30
percent discount on their old Mexican debt in exchange for the new and
more secure Mexican bonds. 97 Assuming a similar discount rate was
applied to the junk bond scheme, the investor would only be receiving
98
an estimated 10 percent return, clearly not worth his investment risk.
Although the banks would obviously offer a higher discount rate if they
were receiving cash in exchange for their old debt (versus newly issued
sovereign bonds), even if the banks were willing to offer a 50 percent to
60 percent discount on the loans, the repackaged bonds would still only
yield approximately 14 percent9 9 which would not be much more than
the 13.5 percent average return on U.S. corporate junk bonds.100
As the debt crisis continues, and if the economic situation of the debtor
nations continues to worsen, the creditor banks may be willing to take
greater losses in order to unload their LDC debt. These same factors,
however, which cause the banks to offer steeper discount rates, will only
cause investors to demand a greater return on the proposed LDC junk

95. An example of such diplomatic problems is illustrated by the Chinese Government's
reaction to the court decision in Jackson. The Chinese Government warned that any attempts
to attach Chinese property, as a result of the district court's first decision in favor of the
plaintiffs, could lead to corresponding measures against American property in China. See
Leigh, Judicial Decision, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 144, 146 (1983) (construing Jackson v. People's
Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982)).
96. Obviously the investors will demand a greater return due to the increased measurable
risk they are taking as well.
97. Bennett, supra note 16.
98. This assumes that the Mexican loans pay off an average of 7 percent although most
of the interest rates on the loans are based on some premium above LIBOR.
99. Osborn, supra note 53, at 75.
100. McGough, supra note 69, at 23.
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bonds. Thus, there appears to be an insurmountable gap between what
the banks are willing to offer and what investors are willing to take.' 0 '
The only step which might force banks to take greater losses, and thus
establish the LDC junk bonds as a feasible instrument, would be if regulators forced banks to write down the value of their loans to "market
02
value" or at least create loan loss reserves consistent with market prices. '
In this scenario, the banks would have less to lose by selling their loans
at a steep discount because they already would have been forced to write
down their losses.
In any case, the above problems of attracting investors, combined with
the probable opposition of the LDC debtors to the junk bond scheme,
make it unlikely that the above plan, as it stands, will have much success.
It should be noted, however, that the so-called LDC junk bonds would
become much more attractive if they were backed by some sort of collateral. The collateral could consist of various assets. For example, the
LDC debtor could follow the model of the above discussed Morgan Plan
and use whatever foreign exchange is available to buy long-term U.S.
Treasury bonds; or possibly, the LDC debtor could enter into a transaction
similar to Michael Milken's "equitization" plan. 103 According to this plan,
bank debt is swapped for an equity investment in a profitable local industry, for example, Mexican oil or Bolivian tin, and such equity investment is used to back the newly created junk bonds. 104 In whatever form
the collateral takes, such an action would lower the amount of return that
potential investors would demand as they would then be assured of receiving at least some return should the LDC debtors default on their
bonds. Thus, because the investors would be demanding less return, the
banks would not have to offer such steep discounts in order to make the

101. However, were the yields on U.S. corporate junk bonds to drop substantially, LDC
junk bonds might become much more attractive to investors. This is a possibility. "As more

investors join the chase for high yields, the market should grow more efficient. The interest
rate advantage that quality junk bonds have offered compared with high-grade corporate
bonds should narrow." Worthy, supra note 67, at 33. Considering that the risk associated
with U.S. corporate junk bonds may have been overestimated (see Comment, Junk Bonds:
Do They Have a Value?, 35 EMORY L.J. 921, 926 (1986)), the future yields on these junk

bonds may drop, thus necessitating a new investment instrument to satisfy the demand of
those investors who need the "fix" of high yield. See Worthy, supra note 67.
102. Clearly the banks are moving in this direction as is evidenced by Citibank's much

publicized move to increase dramatically its loan loss reserves in 1987. Many banks followed
in Citibank's steps and indeed the European banks have been increasing their loan loss
provisions for some time. As the disappointing results of the Morgan Plan illustrate, however,
it seems that many banks are still not ready to accept the losses that are necessary for the

success of the LDC junk bond scheme. See Bennett, supra note 17, at 35, col. I; Evans,
supra note 15, at 73.
103. See Wayne, supra note 83, at 14, cols. 2-4.
104. Id.
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repackaged loans attractive to investors. The gap between investors' demands and banks' offers would narrow and the sale of the LDC debt in
the form of junk bonds would become more feasible.
This added factor, of converting the LDC debt into asset-backed junk
bonds, will require the support of the LDC debtors as they will be the
parties required to provide the collateral. At this point, the LDC debtors
have no incentive to provide an asset for collateralization purposes unless
they receive something in return, such as reduction in required interest
payments, as the Morgan Plan provided, or new foreign investments or
loans. Without such concessions, it seems extremely unlikely that the
LDC debtors will relinquish either scarce foreign exchange reserves or
allow potential loss of control to foreigners of the industries that produce
such foreign exchange. 10 5 As one financier stated, "no self-respecting
country is going to pledge its best assets." 10 6 However, if the banks do
grant such concessions to the LDC debtors in order to secure these assets
as backing for the new junk bonds, the entire junk bond scheme will once
again appear to be too costly from the banks' point of view. The banks
will not be willing to offer the LDC debtors either partial forgiveness on
their loans, reduced interest payments, or new loans, and at the same
time offer potential investors the steep discounts which are required to
attract their interest in the asset-backed junk bonds. Such action would
require the banks to take losses greater than they are currently willing to
bear.
The LDC junk bond scheme cannot hope to achieve success until some
event forces a change in position of at least some of the parties involved.
In the current situation it appears that neither the LDC debtors, the
creditor banks, nor the third party investors have enough incentive to
enter such transactions. Although the junk bond scheme currently does
not seem to be a feasible option, an analysis of the Plan is useful because
it helps to highlight the concerns that a successful securitization must
address.
III. Conclusion
Securitization is clearly a useful mechanism by which a partial solution
of the debt crisis can be achieved. In theory, it offers a way for some

105. For instance, Venezuela has already rejected Michael Milken's attempts to persuade
it to pledge its oil as collateral for a new bond issue. Truell & Schwartz, supra note 4, at
6, col. 4. Regarding their principal industries, the LDCs have shown great reluctance to

allow too much foreign investment in these industries for fear that foreign interests will
eventually dominate these industries, which are essential to the LDCs' domestic economies.
See Riding, supra note 1, at D8, col. 4; Truell & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 6, col. 4.
106. Truell & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 6, col. 4 (quoting George Soros).
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debt relief to be transferred to the LDC debtors and at the same time it
allows the creditor banks to obtain assurance that they will receive at
least some return on their LDC loans. However, the ideal plan, which
will attract the widespread support of both debtors, creditors and potential
third party investors, has yet to be designed. As the above analysis points
out, any successful securitization plan must include certain basic
ingredients.
First, the banks must be assured that once they take a major loss upon
selling or swapping their LDC loans, they will not be forced to take another
loss. The danger of the "double hit" problem of the Morgan Plan must
be avoided. To avoid this problem, the securitization plan must provide
that the banks get cash, or at least a cash equivalent, in return for offering
steep discounts on the sale or swap of their LDC loans. If a plan is adopted
in which the banks agree to sell the debt to private investors, such as
under the junk bond scheme, they will receive the cash. If a debt for debt
swap, similar to the Morgan Plan, is envisioned, then the banks must
receive an instrument which can be resold for its face value. Thus in a
debt for debt swap not only must the principal of the bond be secured,
as occurred under the Morgan Plan, but the interest must also be secured
so that the entire instrument becomes a risk free asset. Securing the
interest creates problems, however, because it is unclear what kind of
collateral will be used to secure the interest. As is indicated by the LDC
debtors' reactions to Milkin's "equitization" plan, it seems unlikely that
these nations will want, or for that matter even be able, to provide such
collateral to secure the interest on such instruments. It would thus appear
that a third party, such as the World Bank, would have to perform this
function. Indeed, plans have already been proposed that the World Bank
take the role of guarantor of at least the interest, if not more, on the new
LDC bonds. 10 7 Involving the World Bank, however, requires obtaining
the assent of its members, most notably the United States, who up until
now have expressed opposition to the World Bank's assuming such a
role. 108
In addition, if the new LDC bonds are really to be considered the
equivalent of cash they must be easily negotiable. This requires that in a
plan, such as the Morgan Plan, the bonds must be issued in bearer form
and not required to be registered. Granted, this may prevent the LDC
debtors from having any further power over the banks regarding new
money. However, it only seems fair that if the banks are willing to take
107. See Testimony of Louis G. Schirano, Senior Vice President of First Interstate Bank
Limited, Before the Subcomm. on International Development, Institutions and Finance,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
108. See Farnsworth, supra note 58, at D2, col. 5.
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large losses that it be a one-time event. There is no reason why, after
providing some debt relief, the banks should be saddled with the economic
problems of the LDCs. This is not to say that future economic aid should
not be provided to the LDC debtors, but rather, that such a burden should
not be involuntarily borne by the banks. The problem of future economic
aid and new loans is one which must be dealt with by public institutions
such as the United Nations, the various international development banks,
and national governments.
Finally, if the creditor banks could be assured by regulators that they
would not be forced to immediately write off any losses they suffered as
a result of offering discounts on the sale of their LDC debt, the banks
might be more willing to offer the steep discounts that are required for a
successful securitization plan. If banks were allowed to defer their losses
to a certain extent, they could better prepare for losses by increasing
their capital and loan loss reserves, so that the losses would not have as
serious an impact on the banks' financial structures and the value of their
stock. In any case, financial regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board, should
announce a clear rule that will put an end to the debate on the accounting
consequences of securitization plans, thereby allowing the creditor banks
to more easily estimate the losses they will be undertaking when engaging
in a securitization plan.
With respect to the LDC debtors, the ideal securitization problem must
also take into account their needs so that they will receive some much
needed aid for their ailing economies. With this in mind, the idea of banks
selling their debt directly to private investors at a substantial discount,
such as some variations of the junk bond scheme call for, should be
rejected. The LDC debtors do not receive enough immediate economic
relief under such schemes. Any discounts that the banks are willing to
offer should be transmitted directly to the LDC debtors in the form of
newly created instruments. Private investors should only enter the picture
as purchasers of these newly created instruments.
As a result of the above statements, it might seem that the entire securitization process should be run by public, rather than private, institutions. Some scholars believe that the economic and political clout
necessary to design a securitization plan that really has an impact on the
debt crisis can only be provided with the help of public institutions, such
as the World Bank. 10 9 Indeed, it might be argued that the investment
banks are motivated by the wrong incentives in their attempts to design

109. See Broad & Cavanagh, How to Approach Third World Debt, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3,
1988, at A31, col. 1.
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a securitization plan. Because the investment banks may be much more
concerned with the commissions that a successful securitization plan will
generate, rather than the impact it will have on LDC debtor economies,
their proposals will not place enough emphasis on the needs of the LDC
debtors.' 10 Although such a theory may have some validity, it does not
account for the fact that the investment banks have come up with some
useful plans that do transfer substantial economic relief to the LDC debtors (e.g., the Morgan Plan). Furthermore, considering the difficulty which
will arise when attempting to obtain political support for any securitization
plan within institutions such as the World Bank, it seems that private
institutions, as well as public institutions, must necessarily continue to
play a major role in designing and implementing successful securitization
plans.

110. The comment of one banker seemed to express this motivation concerning securitization plans when he stated, -[a]t last we could make our loans actually work for us."
Evans, supra note 15, at 85.
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